A thread through the archive
Essays tagged “Schelling point”. Follow an idea across the archive.
Scott argues that taking the Giving What We Can Pledge to donate a fixed percentage of income is the single most impactful decision most people can make, eliminating donation stress while maximizing charitable impact.
Scott explains the economics of bargaining and auctions, showing how prices emerge from negotiations between buyers and sellers when both parties lack perfect information about supply and demand.
Scott explains Nash equilibria (outcomes where no player regrets their strategy given the other's choice) and Schelling points (focal points that help coordinate between multiple equilibria), using examples ranging from meeting a partner to military strategy to show how these game theory concepts apply to real-world coordination problems.
Scott analyzes four mechanisms that make slippery slopes real, using examples like Murder-Gandhi and playing Civilization, and proposes 'Schelling fences' as the solution - clear stopping points that people can credibly commit to defending.
Scott analyzes seven game theory concepts through his experiences playing Diplomacy, demonstrating how trust, enforcement mechanisms, revenge, and coalition-building work in practice, then proposes organizing a game among Less Wrong readers.