Contra Caplan On Arbitrary Deploring
Scott Alexander argues that public outrage over specific misdeeds is not arbitrary, but a strategic way to enforce important social norms with limited resources.
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Essays tagged “strategic thinking”. Follow an idea across the archive.
Scott Alexander argues that public outrage over specific misdeeds is not arbitrary, but a strategic way to enforce important social norms with limited resources.
Scott uses Less Wrong survey data to show that experienced rationalists are actually less likely than newcomers to believe cryonics will work, yet more likely to sign up for it, demonstrating that rationalist training teaches people to act on beliefs rather than making them more credulous.
Scott presents six game theory scenarios demonstrating how strategic thinking can force rational actors into seemingly irrational outcomes, ranging from theoretical examples like evil plutocrats and hostile takeovers to real-world applications like dollar auctions and the Golden Balls game show.
Scott explains backward reasoning in game theory through decision trees, culminating in a counterintuitive example where giving the US president line-item veto power could actually reduce the president's ability to achieve desired outcomes.
Scott presents a thought experiment about using perfect knowledge and intellect to take over ancient Rome as an upper bound for understanding AI takeover scenarios.