A thread through the archive
Essays tagged “belief formation”. Follow an idea across the archive.
Scott argues that focusing on easily debunked fringe beliefs when discussing rationality can be counterproductive, potentially hampering people's ability to doubt their own beliefs and engage in critical thinking.
Scott uses Less Wrong survey data to show that experienced rationalists are actually less likely than newcomers to believe cryonics will work, yet more likely to sign up for it, demonstrating that rationalist training teaches people to act on beliefs rather than making them more credulous.
Scott asks readers for examples of popular, important, factual questions with high uncertainty and no clear 'responsible' position, to use when teaching probabilistic thinking, noting that his previous examples like global warming have become too polarized.
Scott analyzes when assertions should be trusted, showing that their evidentiary value depends on whether you already know the belief's distribution, the asserter's credentials, and how you encountered them, while claims of having 'evidence' mostly serve as signals of rationality rather than factual proof.
Scott argues that affirmations (repeatedly stating goals aloud) might actually work based on evidence that subconscious beliefs affect success and that verbal repetition influences subconscious beliefs, though he acknowledges this needs proper scientific study.
Using a haunted mansion thought experiment, Scott argues that one mind can hold separate levels of belief about ghosts: what it professes, what it bets on, and what it fears.