Bargaining and Auctions
Scott explains the economics of bargaining and auctions, showing how prices emerge from negotiations between buyers and sellers when both parties lack perfect information about supply and demand.
A thread through the archive
Essays tagged “Ultimatum Game”. Follow an idea across the archive.
Scott explains the economics of bargaining and auctions, showing how prices emerge from negotiations between buyers and sellers when both parties lack perfect information about supply and demand.
Scott examines experimental data on how people actually behave in Prisoner's Dilemma and Ultimatum Game situations, finding that people use various heuristics like tit-for-tat and fairness considerations rather than purely rational strategies.
Scott explains how real-world solutions to Prisoner's Dilemmas work through social institutions, reputation systems, and evolved emotions like friendship and anger.
Scott surveys research on priming, including studies showing it can sway political judgments and votes, and suggests deciding important matters in a neutral environment.