A thread through the archive
Essays tagged “cognitive biases”. Follow an idea across the archive.
Scott Alexander defends the concept of automaticity in psychology, arguing that core cognitive biases and priming effects are real, while acknowledging some claims have been overstated.
Scott clarifies his stance on conspiracy theories and expert trust, advocating for a nuanced approach that acknowledges both the value of expert opinion and the potential for misrepresentation.
Scott Alexander examines the use of absurdity arguments, reflecting on his critique of Neom and offering strategies to balance absurdity heuristics with careful reasoning.
Scott Alexander examines the Forer Effect, reframing common 'psychic' statements as insights about human nature and self-compassion tools.
Scott Alexander reviews 'The Scout Mindset' by Julia Galef, a book on rationality that emphasizes seeking truth over defending beliefs and addresses both intellectual and emotional aspects of clear thinking.
Scott Alexander examines why some people struggle to acknowledge others' preferences that deviate from social norms, drawing from personal experiences and psychological theories.
Scott Alexander proposes that confirmation bias might be a misapplication of normal Bayesian reasoning rather than a separate cognitive phenomenon.
Scott Alexander explores 'epistemic learned helplessness', arguing it's often a rational defense against persuasive but false ideas, especially in unfamiliar fields.
Scott Alexander introduces 'prospiracy theories', positive conspiracy-style memes designed to spread true and beneficial information, in response to the rapid spread of conspiracy theories on social media.
Scott proposes that value differences arise from people crystallizing heuristics at different levels, rather than from fundamental, incomprehensible differences in values.
Scott Alexander addresses feedback on his conflict vs. mistake theory post, acknowledging criticisms while defending the core concept's usefulness as a starting point for understanding different approaches to societal problems.
Scott Alexander reflects on turning 33 and questions whether the changes in his thinking represent true wisdom or are the result of socialization, trauma, or neurological changes.
Scott Alexander explores potential links between perception of optical illusions and cognitive styles, proposing further research to investigate these connections.
Scott Alexander defends Less Wrong and Eliezer Yudkowsky against accusations of being anti-scientific, arguing that developing rational thinking skills beyond traditional scientific methods is valuable and necessary.
Scott Alexander argues that rationality should be viewed as habit cultivation rather than a limited resource, drawing parallels with aikido and lucid dreaming techniques.
Scott Alexander examines the process of 'crystallizing patterns' in thinking, discussing its benefits and potential pitfalls across various domains.
Scott Alexander contrasts two studies with opposite conclusions about stress, highlighting the inconsistency in how we interpret adversity's effects.
Scott Alexander discusses how the clarity experienced when awakening from meditation-induced delusions mirrors his appreciation for simplifying philosophical concepts.
Scott announces an essay competition on 'risk' with a 200 euro first prize, noting the organizer's interest in probability calibration and cognitive biases.
Scott proposes that class-based attitudes toward wealth redistribution are driven by status signaling rather than "last place aversion," where lower middle class people oppose redistribution to differentiate themselves from the poor, while upper middle class people support it to differentiate themselves from the lower middle class.
Scott proposes a LessWrong community survey to gather demographics and opinions, shares a draft, and asks readers to suggest additional questions and weigh in on privacy concerns about releasing raw data.