Contra DeBoer On Temporal Copernicanism
Scott Alexander refutes Freddie deBoer's argument against expecting major events in our lifetimes, presenting a more nuanced approach to estimating such probabilities.
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Essays tagged “probability”. Follow an idea across the archive.
Scott Alexander refutes Freddie deBoer's argument against expecting major events in our lifetimes, presenting a more nuanced approach to estimating such probabilities.
Scott Alexander defends using probabilities for hard-to-model events, arguing they aid clear communication and decision-making even in uncertain domains.
Scott Alexander analyzes results from a 2022 prediction contest, discussing top performers and methods for improving forecast accuracy.
Scott Alexander examines the concept of 'Pascalian Medicine', weighing the pros and cons of taking multiple unproven but potentially beneficial treatments.
Scott reviews 'The Black Swan' by Nassim Taleb, examining its key concepts and Taleb's unique perspective on probability and risk.
Scott Alexander reviews a paper that claims to solve the Fermi Paradox by using probability distributions instead of point estimates in Drake Equation calculations.
Scott Alexander argues for the use of probabilities in decision-making even without well-defined models, using examples to show why this approach is necessary and beneficial in real-world situations.
Scott Alexander discusses the problem of overconfidence in probability estimates, arguing that extreme certainty is rarely justified, especially for complex future predictions.
Scott Alexander critiques Dylan Matthews' argument against prioritizing existential risk reduction, arguing that Matthews misuses probabilities and that his logic could also undermine other effective altruist causes.
Scott Alexander presents comprehensive results from the 2011 Less Wrong survey of 1090 respondents, covering demographics, beliefs, probability estimates on various topics, and a calibration test that shows the community performs better than average but has some calibration issues.
Scott explains prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky's model of how people actually make decisions, showing how its value and probability weighting functions predict numerous cognitive biases including loss aversion, scope insensitivity, and framing effects.
Scott asks whether there's an accepted method for measuring calibration separately from domain knowledge, noting that common scoring rules conflate the two.
Scott describes six techniques for translating vague probability feelings into accurate numerical estimates, explaining the strengths and weaknesses of each method.
Scott distinguishes between an argument's internal confidence level and our external confidence in that argument, showing that extremely high probability claims should be moderated by the baseline probability that the argument itself is flawed.
Scott analyzes results from a 166-person Less Wrong survey covering demographics, probability estimates on various topics, and philosophical positions, finding a highly educated, mostly male, atheist, politically libertarian/liberal community with surprisingly accurate collective knowledge but notable gaps between stated beliefs and actions.
Scott announces the official survey is ready with a link, noting it uses percentage format for probabilities and will be open for about a week before results are calculated.